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Note
A FREE BITE AT THE APPLE: HOW FLAWED
STATUTORY DRAFTING HAS UNDERMINED
THE PURPOSE OF THE PATENT TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD
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ABSTRACT
In the years before Congress passed the America Invents Act, patent
litigation became exorbitantly expensive. Congress created three types
of proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB),
which were intended to provide a cheaper and more cost-effective
alternative to district court litigation over patent validity. A major factor
in ensuring that the PTAB proceedings effectively substituted for
district court litigation was a harsh estoppel provision that prevented
any petitioner from relitigating any issue which was raised or
reasonably could have been raised during the PTAB proceeding. The
Federal Circuit, however, recently applied a narrow interpretation to
the estoppel provision which jeopardizes the ability of PTAB
proceedings to replace district court litigation.
While it would be easy to place all the blame on the Federal Circuit
for defanging the estoppel provision, this Note argues that the failure
of PTAB proceedings to substitute for district court litigation ultimately
stems from poor drafting within the America Invents Act. The
combination of broad Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
substantive rulemaking power, unreviewable PTAB decisions to
institute, and a sweeping estoppel provision doomed PTAB
proceedings to failure. This Note offers that Congress must update the
language of the statute itself in order to effectively address the issues
presented by this combination.
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INTRODUCTION
Addressing a conference of intellectual property attorneys, Chief
Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit called the PTAB a “death squad”
for patents that “kill[s] property rights.”1 At the time he made this
statement, the label—ominous as it was—had some measure of truth
to it.2 Judge Rader was referring to the common critique that once the
PTAB chooses to “institute,”3 or initiate, review on the validity of a
patent,4 petitioners typically succeeded in invalidating at least one
“claim,” or component, of that patent.5 By and large, however, labels
of the PTAB being a “death squad” were unwarranted6 and the
administrative proceedings before the PTAB were effectively serving
their purpose7 as a cheaper alternative to district court litigation.8 That
1. Tony Dutra, Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest Patent Reform Bill,
BNA
(Oct.
29,
2013),
https://www.bna.com/rader-regrets-cls-n17179879684
[https://perma.cc/MUY6-9UCR].
2. See Ryan Davis, PTAB’s ‘Death Squad’ Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, LAW360
(Aug. 14, 2014, 5:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/567550/ptab-s-death-squad-label-nottotally-off-base-chief-says [https://perma.cc/4AU5-ZLDQ] (“The Patent Trial and Appeal
Board’s reputation as a ‘death squad’ for patents is ‘unfortunate language,’ but in some ways it
adequately describes the mission Congress gave the board under the America Invents Act, its
chief judge said at a meeting Thursday.”).
3. An administrative proceeding before the PTAB begins when the PTAB initiates review,
referred to as “institut[ing]” review, on some or all of the grounds challenging the validity of a
patent. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). For an overview of the different forms of administrative
proceedings held before the PTAB, see infra Part I.B. For an overview of institution on grounds
raised in a petition, see infra Part II.
4. Petitioners raise “grounds” in a proceeding before the PTAB to challenge “claims” of
the patent. A ground, as used in this Note, is a legal challenge to the validity of a patent. A claim,
as used in this Note, refers to a patent claim. Patent claims define the scope of the patent and
detail what the patent does. Each patent may have multiple claims within it.
5. See Amy Simpson & Hwa Lee, PTAB Kill Rates: How IPRs Are Affecting Patents,
LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2015, 9:44 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/699860/ptab-kill-rates-howiprs-are-affecting-patents [https://perma.cc/9LRQ-H4HA] (noting that “88 percent of petitions
with final written decisions resulted in at least one claim being invalidated”).
6. See id. (“Success starts and ends with the petition. The invalidity success rate for fully
instituted petitions is 82 percent while the invalidity success rate for partially instituted petitions
plummets to 52 percent. The PTAB’s first impression of the petition’s strength appears to affect
the entire proceeding and ultimate outcome.”).
7. For a more in-depth discussion of the purpose of PTAB proceedings, see infra Part I.A.
8. See Jonathan Tamimi, Breaking Bad Patents: The Formula for Quick, Inexpensive
Resolution of Patent Validity, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 587, 641 (2014) (“The data drawn from
over one year of AIA reviews show that these procedures are effective and will continue to gain
popularity among accused patent infringers.”). In 2012, the year in which PTAB proceedings were
created, the median cost of patent litigation ran between $650,000 and $5 million depending on
the size of the claim. Jim Kerstetter, How Much Is That Patent Lawsuit Going to Cost You?,
CNET (Apr. 5, 2012, 10:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/how-much-is-that-patent-lawsuitgoing-to-cost-you [https://perma.cc/9D7Z-3LPZ].
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was so until recent developments in patent law that have rendered the
label “death squad” uncannily accurate, albeit not for the reasons cited
by Judge Rader.
Before the PTAB existed, patent litigation was immensely
expensive.9 Congress enacted the America Invents Act10 to provide
some reprieve from these large and rising costs. The America Invents
Act created the PTAB and proceedings before it, which are intended
to serve as a faster and more cost-effective substitute for district court
litigation.11 Instead of spending years and millions of dollars litigating
the validity of a patent in a patent infringement suit, post–America
Invents Act, would-be patent infringers can file a petition to challenge
the validity of that patent before the PTAB.12 These proceedings not
only enable the petitioner to save money, but also guarantee the
petitioner will receive a decision within a year.13 Petitioners that choose
this route, however, must also contend with an estoppel provision
limiting what challenges they can raise in subsequent district court
litigation. For example, if petitioners bring an inter partes review (IPR)
proceeding14—the most common proceeding before the PTAB,15

9. See Kerstetter, supra note 8.
10. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
11. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. 3426 (2011) (“Ideally, extending could-have-raised estoppel to
privies will help ensure that if an inter partes review is instituted while litigation is pending, that
review will completely substitute for at least the patents-and-printed-publications portion of the
civil litigation.”). This is discussed in more detail at infra Part I.A. But see Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (“Although Congress changed the name from
‘reexamination’ to ‘review,’ nothing convinces us that, in doing so, Congress wanted to change its
basic purposes, namely, to reexamine an earlier agency decision.”).
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012) (“Subject to the provisions of this chapter, a person who is
not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of
the patent.”). For an explanation of how the PTAB conducts its proceedings, see infra Part I.B.
13. See id. § 316(a)(11) (“The Director shall prescribe regulations–requiring that the final
determination in an inter partes review be issued not later than 1 year after the date on which the
Director notices the institution of a review . . . .”). The Director, in certain instances, may extend
that time period, but not by not more than six months. Id.
14. An IPR is one of the administrative PTAB proceedings that can be used to challenge the
validity of a patent outside the context of district court litigation. It is the most commonly utilized
PTAB proceeding. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
STATISTICS
2
(Dec.
31,
2016)
[hereinafter
2016
PTAB
Statistics],
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia_statistics_december2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JLX-G9ZA] (highlighting that, as of December 31, 2016, IPR petitions
constitute 91 percent of the total number of petitions filed since the proceedings began). An IPR
is significantly cheaper and faster than district court litigation. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (noting
that the PTAB must make its final determination within one year from the date of institution).
15. See 2016 PTAB Statistics, supra note 14 (noting that 91 percent of all petitions for PTAB
review are IPR petitions).
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allowing petitioners to challenge the validity of a patent for novelty and
nonobviousness16—they cannot later challenge the validity of that
patent on “any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could
have raised during that inter partes review.”17 Petitioners who seek out
the advantages of IPR proceedings are thus bound by those decisions,
and cannot later relitigate novelty and nonobviousness at the district
court level.18
This estoppel provision may seem harsh on its face. As this Note
will argue, this harshness is necessary to ensure that IPR proceedings
before the PTAB are a complete substitute for district court litigation
on novelty and nonobviousness grounds. On March 23, 2016, however,
the Federal Circuit—the appellate court with jurisdiction over all
patent appeals—undermined the ability of PTAB proceedings to
substitute for district court litigation in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v.
Automated Creel Systems, Inc.19 In Shaw, Automated Creel sued Shaw
Industries for infringing its patent regarding “creels,” which supply
yarn.20 Automated Creel voluntarily dismissed that suit against Shaw
Industries without prejudice,21 and shortly thereafter Shaw Industries
submitted a petition to the PTAB for an IPR proceeding on all twentyone claims in Automated Creel’s patent.22 The PTAB instituted review
on some, but not all, of the grounds that Shaw Industries raised in its
petition.23 The PTAB ultimately upheld some of the patent claims as
valid but ruled that others were invalid.24
Shaw came before the Federal Circuit on appeal from the PTAB’s
final written decision.25 The Federal Circuit purported to examine the
PTAB’s practice of instituting review on only some rather than all or
none of the grounds raised in an IPR petition—a practice also known
as “partial institution.”26 The Federal Circuit nonetheless used this case
as a vehicle to interpret the degree of estoppel attaching to IPRs, and

16. Petitioners may only challenge novelty and nonobviousness grounds in an IPR. 35 U.S.C.
§ 311. For a more detailed description of IPR proceedings, see infra Part I.B.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e).
18. See id. (noting that estoppel prohibits arguments raised previously before a court of law).
19. Shaw Indus. Grp. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
20. Id. at 1296.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1296–97.
24. Id. at 1297.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1298.
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held in Shaw that estoppel only attaches to challenges raised “during”
an IPR.27 Shaw Industries, in other words, could relitigate the
noninstituted grounds in its petition because Shaw Industries could not
have raised those challenges during the IPR.28 That is, if the petitioner
makes an argument for invalidity on certain grounds but the PTAB
never institutes review on those grounds, the Federal Circuit concluded
that a petitioner could not reasonably have raised that ground during
the IPR.29
It would be easy to say that Shaw shoulders all the responsibility
for upsetting the framework upon which PTAB proceedings rest. But
if one looks more closely at the conundrum the Federal Circuit faced
in Shaw, it becomes clear that Shaw is not solely to blame. The America
Invents Act gave the PTO a large grant of substantive rulemaking
power.30 The PTO quickly used that rulemaking power to draft a
regulation enabling the PTAB to partially institute review on the
grounds raised in a petition.31 Sometimes the PTAB uses partial
institution to remove unmeritorious grounds from an IPR.32 At other
times, the PTAB chooses not to institute on meritorious grounds for
efficiency reasons;33 for example, if those grounds would be
“redundant” with other grounds raised in the petition.34
After Shaw, petitioners can relitigate the noninstituted grounds in
their petitions. Petitioners are only estopped from litigating on the far
narrower set of grounds upon which the PTAB chose to institute. As

27. See id. at 1300 (“The IPR does not begin until it is instituted. Thus, Shaw did not raise—
nor could it have reasonably raised—the Payne-based ground during the IPR.” (citation omitted)
(citing In re Cuozzo Speed Techs, LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1272 (4th Cir. 2015))).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016) (declining to read a
procedural rulemaking limitation into the grant of rulemaking power to the PTO under the
America Invents Act).
31. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2017) (enabling partial institution on grounds raised in a
petition).
32. See id. § 42.108(c) (restricting review only to petitions for which the PTAB has
determined “there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the claims challenged in the
petition is unpatentable”).
33. See Shaw, 817 F.3d at 1298 (noting that “the Board’s statutory obligation to complete
proceedings in a timely and efficient manner” provides some justification for partial institution).
34. See Bob High, Redundant Prior Art References and their Prejudicial Effects on PostIssuance Review Petitioners, 65 EMORY L.J. 581, 602 (2015) (“[T]he PTAB frequently employs
the redundancy doctrine during CBMs and IPRs as a way to cut down the length of the
proceeding.” (citing Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00088, 2013 WL 5970180, at
*1–2 (P.T.A.B. June 13, 2013))).
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such, petitioners preserve grounds the PTAB considered redundant
even if those grounds effectively argue the same point. This result robs
the estoppel provision of its efficacy and as a result, in the wake of
Shaw, the PTAB has become a “death squad” in fact as well as in
reputation. Rather than serving as an alternative to the district courts
on novelty and nonobviousness grounds, PTAB proceedings now serve
only to invalidate patents and “kill[] property rights”35 because
petitioners are not fully bound to the PTAB’s rulings in future
litigation. In other words, instead of serving as a way to settle disputes
between parties, PTAB proceedings now give petitioners a quick,
cheap chance to invalidate a patent. If petitioners do not succeed on
this attempt, they can still bring their claims before the district court.
Shaw thus eliminates any risk petitioners face in bringing an IPR and
allows petitioners to avail themselves of the cheapness and efficiency
of PTAB decisions without submitting to the finality the Board’s
rulings are meant to provide.
On the other hand, the alternative—a broad interpretation of the
estoppel provision—presents its own share of issues. It would be
manifestly inequitable for petitioners who make every effort to litigate
certain challenges before the PTAB to forever lose those challenges
because the PTAB declined to institute upon them. Had Shaw come
out the other way, using a broad interpretation of estoppel, IPR use
also might decrease for the reason that petitioners would fear losing
the chance to litigate even unheard challenges.36 The Federal Circuit
faced an impossible situation when it reviewed Shaw, caught as it was
between the pitfalls of either estoppel interpretation—and because
either interpretation would have spelled danger for PTAB
proceedings, the root of the problem lies beyond Shaw alone.
This Note argues that the failure of PTAB proceedings to
substitute for district court litigation ultimately stems from poor
drafting within the America Invents Act. The combination of broad
PTO substantive rulemaking power, unreviewable PTAB decisions to
institute, and a sweeping estoppel provision doomed PTAB
proceedings to failure. This Note argues that Congress must update the
language of the statute itself in order to effectively address the issues
presented by this combination.

35. Dutra, supra note 1.
36. Petitioners, however, had no way of knowing how the Federal Circuit would interpret
the estoppel provision pre-Shaw yet nonetheless brought many IPR petitions. For further
discussion, see infra note 223 and accompanying text.
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This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a general
overview of the various administrative proceedings before the PTAB.
It first describes the overarching purpose for which Congress created
PTAB proceedings, a cheap and fast substitute for district court
litigation,37 which must shape all analyses of the statute. Part I next
explains the structure of the three main administrative proceedings to
challenge the validity of a patent before the PTAB—IPR, post grant
review, and covered business method. This Note focuses primarily on
the use of IPRs because IPRs are the most commonly utilized PTAB
proceeding.38
Part II delves into the way in which an IPR is instituted. First, it
highlights that the PTAB’s decision to institute is final and
unreviewable.39 Absent a flagrant violation of rights, a court may not
review the PTAB’s decision to institute, or not to institute, an IPR.40
Second, it describes the PTAB’s method for instituting an IPR. In
particular, it details the PTAB’s practice of partially instituting
review—a practice that was eventually codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations by the PTO.41 The development of partial institution had
enormous ramifications on the delicate system created by the America
Invents Act and in many ways made inequity within the proceedings
inevitable. There has been some debate on whether the PTO had the
statutory authority to enable partial institution,42 but this Part argues
that the PTO acted within its statutory grant of powers in enacting
partial institution.
Part III analyzes the effects of combined unreviewability and
partial institution on the degree of estoppel attaching to IPRs.
Specifically, this section emphasizes that the Federal Circuit in Shaw
faced a situation in which an inequitable result was inevitable. If the
estoppel provisions were taken to the full extent of the plain text,

37. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. 3426 (2011).
38. See 2016 PTAB Statistics, supra note 14 (listing statistics that show IPRs are the most
commonly used PTAB proceeding).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012).
40. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016) (“We conclude that
the first provision, though it may not bar consideration of a constitutional question, for example,
does bar judicial review of the kind of mine-run claim at issue here . . . .”).
41. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2017).
42. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The PTO improperly adopted a system
of partial institution and partial final written decision, contravening the statute and the intent of
Congress. The PTO has exceeded its statutory authority.”), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017).
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challengers would be estopped from bringing grounds43 that they never
actually had a chance to litigate,44 and the decision not to reach the
merits on those grounds would be unreviewable.45 Yet, this Part
contends that, equity notwithstanding, the Federal Circuit erred in its
limited-scope interpretation of the estoppel. A limited-scope estoppel
not only undermines the text, structure, and purpose of the statute, but
it also will prove to be a poorly designed fix to inequity in the long run.
It eliminates any risk petitioners face in bringing an IPR and gives
petitioners a chance to invalidate a patent at minimal personal cost.
Part IV proposes solutions to the problems identified above. This
Part asserts that the Federal Circuit should reevaluate Shaw and
interpret the estoppel provision as broadly as Congress intended. This
interpretation may lead to inequity in the short term, but courts cannot
undermine the plain meaning of the statute. Once the estoppel
provision gets due weight, the legislature—and not the courts—must
fix the remaining inconsistencies in the statutory framework.46
Congress could fix the inconsistencies in two ways. It could require allor-none institution or, alternatively, it could require the PTAB to
address every ground raised in a petition in its final written decision
and permit review of the decision to institute.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE PATENT SYSTEM
The life of a patent begins with an application to the PTO, the
agency tasked with “grant[ing] patents for the protection of
inventions.”47 The application must comply with PTO procedural
requirements,48 and the claims within the patent must meet statutory
requirements for patenting.49 Patent examiners at the PTO determine
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (extending estoppel to any claim the petitioner “raised or
reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review”).
44. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (enabling the PTAB to partially institute on claims).
45. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (rendering the decision to institute unreviewable).
46. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case addressing the requirements of the
written decision of an IPR. SAS Inst., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2160. As Part IV argues, however, any
solution implemented by the Supreme Court may sow further chaos in the statutory framework.
47. General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 2015),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents
[https://perma.cc/2R3Q-J3QL].
48. See id. (noting that nonprovisional applications must include a specification describing
the invention and listing the claims, drawings if necessary, an oath, and a filing fee).
49. These statutory requirements include whether the subject matter is patentable, 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, and the claim is novel, id. § 102, nonobvious, id. § 103, definite, id. § 112, enabled, id., and
described, id.
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whether the claims in the application meet the statutory requirements,
but do so under limited resources and rarely with enough time to fully
examine every aspect regarding the validity of a patent. In 2015, for
instance, the PTO received 629,647 patent applications and granted
325,979.50 It is inevitable, due to the sheer volume of applications, that
some of the patents granted will be invalid on at least one of the
statutory grounds. And because patents interfere with innovation
within the scope of their claims,51 the existence of potentially invalid
patents takes on new significance. Litigating at the district court level
is expensive and time consuming. Given these constraints, the
availability of some form of post grant review becomes crucial to the
proper functioning of the patent system. The America Invents Act,
which created the PTAB and its proceedings, was intended to address
this need.
A. The Purpose of PTAB Proceedings
Congress enacted the America Invents Act to provide a cheaper
and more efficient forum than the district courts to litigate the validity
of a patent.52 The statute was enacted against a backdrop of large and
rising costs for patent litigants created by a system of extensive and
complex patenting.53 In 2004 for example, Michael Kirk, then the
executive director of the American Intellectual Property Law
Association, estimated that “the average cost of patent litigation,
including the costs of discovery, ranges between $500,000 and
$3,995,000 per party.”54 By 2012, when the America Invents Act came
into effect, these numbers had climbed even higher. For claims worth
50. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963 - 2015, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
(June
15,
2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm
[https://perma.cc/VKW3-VRKJ].
51. The scope of the patent claim refers to the breadth of the claim, i.e., the extent to which
it covers all inventions within its niche of one of the technological fields.
52. See, e.g., SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC., 825 F.3d 1341, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the proceedings before
the PTAB “substitut[e] . . . for district court proceedings on aspects of patent validity”), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017).
53. Inventors, for instance, can patent improvements on existing patents, creating a system
of “blocking” patents—the second inventor cannot use the improvement without a license for the
underlying patent, and the original inventor cannot use the improvement without a license from
the second inventor.
54. Patent Quality Improvement: Post-Grant Opposition: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 29 (2004)
(statement of Michael Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law
Association).
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less than $1 million, the median cost of litigation was $650,000.55 For
claims between $1 million and $25 million, the median cost of litigation
was $2.5 million.56 For claims worth more than $25 million, the median
cost of litigation was $5 million.57 Faced with the threat of such
“prohibitively expensive” sums, alleged patent infringers tended to
settle even on unmeritorious claims.58 Further compounding this issue,
the validity of many of the patents asserted was dubious at best.59
Proceedings before the PTAB solve the problem of rising costs.60
They provide a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” alternative to district
court litigation.61 After the America Invents Act, instead of litigating
the validity of a patent at the district court level, an alleged infringer
can instead file a petition for review before the PTAB,62 an “expert
tribunal” that “facilitate[s] both the validation of properly issued

55. Kerstetter, supra note 8.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21
FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 600 (2012). Some entities, called patent assertion entities, acquire patents from
other parties merely to assert those patents against alleged infringers and thereby force a large
settlement payout. FTC, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY 1 (2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftcstudy/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2J9XFZBF].
59. Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law
Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1599–1600 (2009) (“They cloak themselves in the
legitimacy of patents, exploiting the widespread perception that where there is a patent there
must be innovation. Sadly, this is not always true. And this stark fact explains succinctly why the
market for true troll activity is not worth defending.”).
60. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J, concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that the proceedings before the PTAB
“substitut[e] . . . for district court proceedings on aspects of patent validity”), cert. granted, 137 S.
Ct. 2160 (2017).
61. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) (2017) (establishing that the regulations the PTO adopts to govern
PTAB proceedings “shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of
every proceeding”).
62. If the petitioner has already been sued for alleged infringement at the district court level,
the petitioner can request a stay of litigation at the district court during the PTAB proceeding.
The America Invents Act sets forth the test the district court should apply in judging whether to
stay litigation pending covered business method review. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act §
18(b)(1), 35 U.S.C. § 321 note (2012). The statute is, however, silent with respect to post grant
reviews and IPRs. A district court is not required to grant a stay pending the outcome of a post
grant review or an IPR, but may choose to do so at its discretion. See, e.g., Invensys Sys., Inc. v.
Emerson Elec. Co., No. 6:12-CV-00799, 2014 WL 4477393, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 25, 2014)
(denying a stay of litigation); Black Hills Media, LLC v. Pioneer Elecs. (USA) Inc., No. CV 1400471 (SJO) (PJWx), 2014 WL 4638170, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2014) (granting a stay of
litigation).
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patents and the elimination of invalid patents.”63 If the PTAB institutes
review on any of the grounds raised in a petition, the petitioner is
guaranteed a decision on that ground within a year,64 subject at most to
a six-month extension for good cause.65 This system potentially saves
petitioners years of litigation and the consequent costs. If the PTAB
invalidates any patent claims, those claims are no longer part of the
patent, and patent holders cannot file a claim for infringement on those
grounds. If the PTAB upholds any of the patent claims, on the other
hand, the petitioner cannot later challenge the patent on the same
grounds at the district court level if a patent holder sues the petitioner
for infringement.66 This limitation significantly reduces the number of
contested issues within the district court litigation.67
The estoppel provision is, in many ways, the glue that holds this
system together. Estopping the same petitioner from relitigating
nonobviousness and novelty grounds protects the system from abuse.
It prevents parties from challenging the same patent multiple times on
grounds that they raised or could reasonably have raised during the
first proceeding.68 It thus ensures that the proceedings constitute a true
substitute for the district court within their scope.69
B. The Main Forms of Review Before the PTAB
The America Invents Act creates, among other specialized forms
of review,70 three main administrative proceedings in which petitioners
may challenge the validity of a patent before the PTAB, including post

63. SAS Inst. Inc., 825 F.3d at 1353 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2012).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 315(e)(2).
67. See id. (noting that petitioners cannot relitigate the same grounds at the district court
level, reducing the number of issues before the district court).
68. See 157 CONG. REC. 2710 (2011) (noting that the bill “would include a strengthened
estoppel standard to prevent petitioners from raising in a subsequent challenge the same patent
issues that were raised or reasonably could have been raised in a prior challenge. The bill would
significantly reduce the ability to use post grant procedures for abusive serial challenges to
patents.”).
69. But see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016) (“The problem
with Cuozzo’s argument, however, is that, in other significant respects, inter partes review is less
like a judicial proceeding and more like a specialized agency proceeding.”).
70. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 257 (2012) (governing supplemental examination review, which
protects against a claim of inequitable conduct).
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grant review,71 covered business method review,72 and IPR.73 A
challenger may, within the first nine months of a patent’s life,74 bring a
post grant review proceeding on any ground of invalidity.75 After nine
months76—unless the patent is a covered business method patent77—a
challenger may only bring an IPR on novelty and nonobviousness
grounds.78
All three proceedings feature a number of advantages over district
court litigation, making them more attractive to those challenging the
validity of a patent. As mentioned above, these proceedings are subject
to strict time constraints to ensure they fulfill their promise of
providing a faster alternative to district court litigation.79 Not only are
the proceedings before the PTAB efficient and therefore less costly
than district court litigation,80 they are also subject to a preponderance
of the evidence standard of review.81 Finally, there is a good chance of
success if the PTAB institutes review on a petition because the
standard for institution requires that the PTAB find “a reasonable
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
[one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”82
Despite these common benefits, each proceeding nonetheless
serves a unique function within the system and incorporates a different
type of estoppel against subsequent PTAB and district court
proceedings. This Note primarily analyzes IPRs, but this Section

71. Id. § 321.
72. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 529–31 (2011).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 311.
74. Id. § 321(c).
75. Id. § 321(b).
76. Id. § 311(c).
77. For more information on covered business method patents, see infra Part I.B.2.
78. Id. § 311(b).
79. For more information on the time limitations of PTAB proceedings, see supra notes 64–
65 and accompanying text.
80. Instead of litigating the validity of a patent for years before a district court, spending
countless dollars on legal fees and risking the potential of accruing additional damages, see supra
notes 52–59, petitioners litigating before the PTAB receive a decision within a year and accrue
fewer legal fees in the process, see infra note 81.
81. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); id. § 326(e); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011) (aligning the standards and procedures of covered
business method review with those of post grant review).
82. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also id. § 324(a) (requiring that a petition for post grant review
“demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least [one] of the claims challenged in the
petition is unpatentable”); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1) (aligning the standards
and procedures of covered business method review with those of post grant review).
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provides a brief overview of all three forms of review in order to
contextualize the proceedings before the PTAB. The issues later
presented with respect to IPRs also apply in full to post grant review
proceedings because post grant review proceedings are subject to the
same estoppel standard.83 Covered business method review, because it
utilizes a different standard of estoppel,84 sheds light on the analysis
only to the extent that it further reinforces how the estoppel provision
of IPRs should apply.
1. Post Grant Review. Post grant review is the most complete
substitute for district court litigation of the proceedings before the
PTAB. Yet, due to its short filing deadlines, it is also the least
commonly used form of review.85 Any patent may be challenged in a
post grant review proceeding, and petitioners may raise any ground of
invalidity during the course of that proceeding.86 If the PTAB institutes
on some or all of the grounds raised in a post grant review petition,
petitioners cannot later challenge the same patent claim “on any
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised
during that post grant review.”87 Post grant review, however, is only
available for petitioners during the first nine months following the
issuance of a patent.88 Given the high rate at which patents are
granted,89 few petitioners are able to identify invalid patents quickly
enough to meet the deadline for post grant review.90 The time
constraint therefore limits its potential as a substitute for district courts.
2. Covered Business Method Review. Covered business method
review is a transitional form of PTAB review created by the America
Invents Act. It became available on September 16, 2012, and will sunset
83. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (establishing a raised or reasonably could have raised
standard for estoppel), with id. § 325(e) (same).
84. For an explanation of the estoppel attaching to covered business method reviews, see
infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
85. See 2016 PTAB Statistics, supra note 14 (noting that petitions for post grant review
constitute only 1 percent of the total petitions made to the PTAB).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b). Those grounds include, for instance, patent eligible subject matter,
id. § 101, utility, id. § 101, novelty, id. § 102, nonobviousness, id. § 103, definiteness, id. §112,
written description, id. § 112, and enablement, id. § 112.
87. Id. § 325(e)(1).
88. Id. § 321(c).
89. For more information on the rate at which patents are granted, see supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
90. Between September 16, 2012 and December 31, 2016, only forty-four post grant review
petitions were filed with the PTAB. 2016 PTAB Statistics, supra note 14, at 2.
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on September 16, 2020.91 Petitioners may only bring a covered business
method review on a “covered business method patent[],” a label which
encompasses a small subset of patents.92 Covered business method
review proceedings are subject to the same standards and procedures
as post grant review proceedings, with a few exceptions.93 As is the case
with post grant review, for example, petitioners may challenge a
covered business method patent on any ground of invalidity.94 There is,
however, no nine-month time constraint to file a covered business
method challenge.95 Covered business method review is also subject to
a different estoppel provision than post grant review.96 If the PTAB
institutes on a petition, the petitioner cannot later raise any challenge
actually brought before the PTAB during that covered business
method review, but is free to raise challenges that reasonably could
have been brought before the PTAB—unlike post grant review.97
3. Inter Partes Review. IPRs constitute almost all of the petitions
filed before the PTAB despite the fact that the scope of an IPR is much
more limited than post grant review or covered business method
review.98 Petitioners may only bring IPRs after nine months have
passed from the issuance of a patent,99 so IPRs replace post grant
review proceedings once the time limit has expired on the latter. These
91. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(3)(A), 35 U.S.C. § 321 note (2012) (“This
subsection, and the regulations issued under this subsection, are repealed effective upon the
expiration of the 8–year period beginning on the date that the regulations issued under to
paragraph (1) take effect.”); Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-applicationprocess/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/transitional-program-covered-business
[https://perma.cc/FKL8-CNEU].
92. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1), 325 U.S.C. § 321 note (2012). A covered
business method patent is a patent “claim[ing] a method or corresponding apparatus for
performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or
management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for
technological inventions.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(d)(1).
93. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(A).
94. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012).
95. See id. § 321(c) (imposing a nine-month time constraint on filing petitions for post grant
review); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(A) (exempting covered business method
review from § 321(c)’s requirements).
96. See 25 U.S.C. § 325(e)(2) (2012) (imposing estoppel rules for post grant review); LeahySmith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(A) (exempting covered business method review from §
325(e)(2)’s requirements).
97. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(D).
98. See 2016 PTAB Statistics, supra note 14, at 2 (showing that IPR petitions comprise 91
percent of the total petitions filed before the PTAB).
99. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c).
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filing time differences ensure that petitioners cannot pick and choose
between the two forms of review; the choice is made for the petitioner
depending on when he chooses to file. During the course of an IPR,
petitioners may only challenge a patent claim on the grounds of novelty
and nonobviousness.100 If the PTAB institutes review on a petition, the
petitioner cannot later litigate any challenge he “raised or reasonably
could have raised during that inter partes review.”101 This estoppel
provision, even taken at its broadest, therefore permits a petitioner to
later challenge the validity of a patent on grounds other than novelty
and nonobviousness. As noted above, because IPRs are utilized much
more extensively than the other forms of review available before the
PTAB, the remainder of this Note will focus on IPRs.
II. THE VALIDITY OF PARTIAL INSTITUTION UNDER THE AMERICA
INVENTS ACT
An IPR begins when the PTAB “institute[s]”102 review on all or
some of the grounds raised in a petition.103 The decision to institute—
or not to institute—an IPR is “final and nonappealable”;104 in other
words, the courts may not review the merits of the decision.105
A. The History Behind the Adoption of Partial Institution
The America Invents Act does not detail the manner in which the
PTAB institutes an IPR review. It provides for the PTAB to institute
review on grounds raised in a petition for an IPR,106 but it fails to
specify whether that review must be on all of the grounds raised or only
some of the grounds. In the absence of a clear statutory guideline, the
PTO exercised its rulemaking authority under the America Invents

100. Id. § 311(b) (allowing in IPRs only those grounds that could be raised under sections 102
or 103); see also id. § 102 (establishing novelty as a condition for patentability); § 103
(nonobviousness). Other grounds, such as § 101 patent eligible subject matter or § 112
definiteness, are not available to the petitioner in an IPR.
101. Id. § 315(e).
102. Id. § 314(a).
103. The PTAB may, of course, choose not to institute review on any of the grounds raised in
a petition—in that case, no IPR has occurred, and the petitioner is free to raise those grounds in
subsequent litigation.
104. Id. § 314(d).
105. But see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016) (explaining that
the court may review institution decisions in cases involving “shenanigans” such as a violation of
a petitioner’s constitutional rights).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 314.
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Act107 and enacted a regulation in 2012 permitting the PTAB to
partially institute—that is, to institute review on only some of the
grounds raised in an IPR petition.108
The PTO’s interest in allowing the PTAB to partially institute
made a great deal of sense when the regulation was codified. The first
time the PTAB utilized partial institution, for example, a petitioner
had raised 422 challenges to the validity of twenty claims within a
patent.109 For each patent claim, in other words, the petitioner
challenged it on roughly twenty-one grounds.110 It would have been
nearly impossible for the PTAB to review all of these challenges and
still meet its statutory deadline for rendering a final decision.111 Citing
efficiency reasons, the PTAB identified redundant grounds within the
petition.112 It then ordered the petitioner to choose only one ground
from each set of redundant grounds to use in the proceeding.113
The case described above, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v.
Progressive Casualty Insurance Company,114 involved a covered
business method review, but the logic behind it was quickly extended
to IPRs.115 In the PTAB’s first IPR decision, Garmin International, Inc.
v. Cuozzo Speed Technologies LLC,116 the petitioners raised many
varying novelty and nonobviousness challenges against twenty patent
claims.117 The PTAB, however, instituted review only on two of those
grounds—and only on those two grounds as applied to three of the
twenty patent claims challenged.118 The PTAB ruled that the petitioner

107. See id. § 316(a)(2) (enabling the PTO to “set[] forth the standards for the showing of
sufficient grounds to institute a review); id. § 316(a)(4) (allowing the PTO to draft regulations
“establishing and governing inter partes review”).
108. See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg.
48,680, 48,728 (Aug. 14, 2012) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 42.108).
109. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM-2012-00003 (JL), 2012 WL
9494791, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012).
110. Id.
111. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (requiring the PTAB to render a final decision within one
year, with an available six-month extension for good cause).
112. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 9494791, at *1.
113. Id. at *4, *6, *7, *8, *9.
114. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM-2012-00003 (JL), 2012 WL
9494791 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012).
115. Id. at *1.
116. Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. IPR2012-00001 (JL), 2013 WL
5947691 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2013).
117. Id. at *1–2.
118. Id. at *14–15.
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had not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any of the other
grounds raised in the petition and declined to institute review upon
them.119 In this way, partial institution became an accepted practice
during proceedings before the PTAB.
B. Criticism Regarding the Adoption and Implications of Partial
Institution
From the outset, the practice of partial institution by the PTAB
has been criticized by some in the patent community. Critics argue that
the deference standard for agency interpretations laid out in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.120 should not
apply to the PTO’s adoption of partial institution.121 Under Chevron,
courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision if the
statute is ambiguous, and given that ambiguity, the agency’s
interpretation is a reasonable reading of the statute.122 The Federal
Circuit in Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corporation123 recently
upheld the validity of partial institution as a “reasonable interpretation
of the statutory provision governing the institution of inter partes
review” under Chevron.124 Critics nonetheless argue that partial
institution is not entitled to Chevron deference because the PTO
exceeded the bounds of its statutory authority in codifying partial
institution.125
119. Id. at *14.
120. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron,
a court grants deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision if: 1) Congress has
not directly spoken on the issue, or the statute is ambiguous, and 2) provided the statute is
ambiguous, the agency’s interpretation is a permissible reading of the statute; in other words, if it
is reasonable. Id. at 842–43.
121. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The PTO departed from the statute in
adopting regulations that authorize review of only some of the challenged claims and grounds, as
in 37 C.F.R. 42.108(a).”), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017); Timothy K. Wilson & John S.
Sieman, Guest Post: PTAB Partial Institution of IPR and CBM Review Violates the AIA– But
There Is a Simple Fix, PATENTLY-O (May 29, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/05/partialinstitution-violates.html [https://perma.cc/VN3Q-QYPF] (“While the PTAB’s practice of partial
institution may help complete trials within the required one-year period, the practice violates the
statute and strips petitioners of a statutory appeal right as to excluded claims.”).
122. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842–43.
123. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2016), overruled on
other grounds, Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
124. Id. at 1316.
125. See SAS Inst., Inc., 825 F.3d at 1356 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“The PTO departed from the statute in adopting regulations that authorize review of only
some of the challenged claims and grounds, as in 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).”); Wilson & Sieman, supra
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First, critics claim that partial institution unambiguously violates
the text of the statute itself.126 The statute requires the PTAB to issue
a final decision “with respect to the patentability of any patent claim
challenged by the petitioner.”127 This decision, the argument goes, must
include all grounds the petitioner challenges, not just the instituted
grounds.128 To exclude certain grounds from the final decision “strips
petitioners of a statutory appeal right as to excluded [grounds],”
violating the clear language of the statute.129
Second, critics argue that partial institution undermines the
purpose of replacing district court litigation.130 As Judge Newman
summarized, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Synopsys, Inc.,
under the statutory framework, the PTAB may not institute review on
only some of the grounds raised in a petition for review.131 Contrary to
the majority’s assertion that it was required to defer to the agency’s
interpretation under Chevron, Judge Newman wrote, “[T]he intent of
Congress is plain in the statute. There is no ambiguity, and no silence;
Chevron provides no support for ‘pick and choose’ authority.”132 In
other words, Congress plainly intended for PTAB proceedings to serve
as a cheap and fast substitute for district court litigation.133 Extending
this logic, the implementation of partial institution undermines this
goal because petitioners are no longer assured that all of their grounds
challenging a patent claim—at least with respect to novelty or
nonobviousness—will be litigated with finality in this alternative
forum. Rather than saving the petitioner time and money, therefore,
the proceedings merely “impose[] additional delay, uncertainty, and
cost” on petitioners.134 If petitioners cannot rely on PTAB proceedings
note 121 (“While the PTAB’s practice of partial institution may help complete trials within the
required one-year period, the practice violates the statute and strips petitioners of a statutory
appeal right as to excluded claims.”).
126. See Wilson & Sieman, supra note 121 (arguing that partial institution violates the text of
the statute).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2012).
128. Wilson & Sieman, supra note 121.
129. Id.
130. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Senator Grassley further summarized,
at enactment, that the purpose of the estoppel is to ‘completely substitute’ for the same issues in
litigation.”), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017).
134. Id.
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to resolve all of their novelty or nonobviousness grounds, the
proceedings cannot be a complete substitute for the district courts on
those challenges.135
Critics additionally emphasize that, prior to the America Invents
Act, the Federal Circuit had never recognized substantive rulemaking
power for the PTO.136 Under previous statutory schemes, the PTO
could only draft rules and regulations about procedural, as opposed to
substantive, matters.137 The implementation of partial institution is
arguably procedural rulemaking, and could thus comply even on a
conservative reading of the PTO’s rulemaking power. On the other
hand, partial institution affects the rights and duties of the parties
involved, which has traditionally been seen as a substantive function.138
Even if the PTO did engage in substantive rulemaking in its adoption
of partial institution, given the Supreme Court’s decision in Cuozzo
Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee,139 the PTO likely did not overstep its
authority. In Cuozzo, the Court explicitly declined to read a procedural
limitation into the PTO’s rulemaking power under the America
Invents Act;140 in other words, the easier substance-versus-procedure
argument is no longer available, and critics are left with other more
difficult arguments about agency authority.
135. Id. (“The ‘complete substitution’ for section 102 and 103 issues cannot occur unless all of
the claims challenged in the petition are included when post-grant review is accepted.”).
136. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (“The word ‘conduct’ connotes procedure. Section 316 identifies areas whose conduct
is assigned to the PTO, including public access to proceedings, discovery rules, and the right to a
hearing. I discern no authorization to the PTO to change the law of how claims of issued patents
are construed.”); see also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“As we have previously held, the broadest of the PTO’s rulemaking powers—35 U.S.C. § 6(a)—
authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only to ‘the conduct of
proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive
rules.”).
137. Merck, 80 F.3d at 1549–50.
138. The Federal Circuit has only addressed the divide between substantive and procedural
rulemaking once, but its decision in that case was subsequently vacated for a rehearing en banc
that never occurred. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 328 F. App’x 658 (Fed.
Cir. 2009). In the vacated decision, the Federal Circuit indicated that it would follow District of
Columbia Circuit precedent on the issue. Id. at 1356. Specifically, the Federal Circuit highlighted
“that a critical feature of the procedural exception [in section 553 of the APA] is that it covers
agency actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interests of parties, although [they] may
alter the manner in which the parties present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency.” Id.
(quoting JEM Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 22 F.3d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
140. See id. at 2143 (declining to read a procedural rulemaking limitation into the grant of
rulemaking power to the PTO under the America Invents Act).
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C. Why Partial Institution is Permissible under the America Invents
Act
In Cuozzo, the Supreme Court addressed two main issues. First,
the Court addressed the reviewability of a decision to institute an IPR;
second, it addressed the PTO’s authority to issue a regulation
implementing the “broadest reasonable interpretation”141 standard of
review for claim construction. The Supreme Court held that, absent
“shenanigans” such as a violation of a petitioner’s constitutional rights,
the decision to institute an IPR was unreviewable.142 It also held that
the broadest reasonable interpretation standard was entitled to
Chevron deference.143 Even though this standard differs from the one
district courts use,144 the Court highlighted that the America Invents
Act does not specify the standard of review that applies to claim
interpretations.145 The Court, finding no clear textual mandate,
deferred to the agency’s interpretation of the standard required.146 In
upholding the PTO’s broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the
Court further noted that the America Invents Act gives the PTO a
broad grant of rulemaking authority to govern the conduct of IPRs,
and that grant was not limited to purely procedural rulemaking.147 The
Court’s recognition of broad rulemaking power renders the line
between procedural and substantive rulemaking irrelevant in the
context of the America Invents Act. If the PTO can issue substantive
rules, it does not matter whether the rule enabling partial institution
was procedural or substantive in nature. The classification has no
impact on its validity.
Beyond classifying the nature of the PTO’s rulemaking, Cuozzo
silences much of the basis for critiquing the adoption of partial
institution. The Supreme Court’s justification for applying Chevron
141. Broadest reasonable interpretation is also the standard that PTO examiners use in their
initial review of a patent application. Broadest reasonable interpretation requires that “an
examiner . . . construe claim terms in the broadest reasonable manner during prosecution as is
reasonably allowed in an effort to establish a clear record of what applicant intends to claim.”
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111
(9th ed. 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2111.html [https://perma.cc/EQP2H2W8]. This standard differs from the standard which the courts apply in interpreting claims. Id.
142. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 136 S. Ct. at 2141–42.
143. Id. at 2141–46.
144. Id. at 2136.
145. See id. at 2141–46 (applying Chevron analysis to the rule implementing broadest
reasonable interpretation and concluding that the rule is entitled to deference).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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deference in Cuozzo naturally extends to cover partial institution. The
Supreme Court first noted that the statute is silent regarding the
standard the PTAB should use in interpreting claims, creating a gap
and ambiguity.148 The Court next reasoned that, although different
standards at the PTAB and district court level “may produce
inconsistent results and cause added confusion,” this possibility alone
is not enough to render the interpretation unreasonable.149 Because the
interpretation was reasonable, the PTAB could use the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard to interpret the scope of patent
claims.
As with the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the
America Invents Act is silent as to when the PTAB should institute
review on the grounds raised in a petition. It also does not specify
whether the PTAB must institute on all of the grounds raised in a
petition or if it may institute on only some of them. The same statutory
provision which granted the PTO authority to regulate the standard for
claim interpretation also governs the PTAB’s institution conduct; that
is, “The Director shall prescribe regulations . . . establishing and
governing inter partes review.”150 It is hard to see how regulations
relating to the number of grounds addressed in the course of an IPR
would be any less a part of “establishing and governing” an IPR than
the standard of claim interpretation utilized within that review. Even
were this grant of rulemaking power lacking, however, the PTO also
has the authority to “set[] forth the standards for the showing of
sufficient grounds to institute a review.”151 Although the Supreme
Court has not definitively affirmed this authority, the combination of
these two provisions in the wake of Cuozzo provides sufficient
foundation to support the PTO’s authority to enable partial
institutions.
A challenger to this line of reasoning might argue against granting
Chevron deference for partial institution on the notion that partial
institutioncontravenes the purpose of PTAB proceedings—providing

148. See id. at 2142 (“No statutory provision unambiguously directs the agency to use one
standard or the other. And the statute ‘express[ly] . . . authoriz[es] [the Patent Office] to engage
in the process of rulemaking’ to address that gap.”).
149. See id. at 2146 (“This possibility, however, has long been present in our patent system,
[providing] different tracks—in the Patent Office and in the courts—for the review and
adjudication of patent claims. . . . These different evidentiary burdens mean that the possibility of
inconsistent results is inherent to Congress’ regulatory design.”).
150. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2012).
151. Id. § 316(a)(2).
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a cheap and fast substitute for district court litigation152—because it
allows for an incomplete substitute for district court litigation.153 If
petitioners do not receive a decision on the merits for all the grounds
they raise before the PTAB, then by definition the partial institution
proceedings do not substitute for district court litigation on
nonobviousness and novelty grounds. But even before Cuozzo, this
line of reasoning would have been weak. In the America Invents Act,
Congress itself specifically instructs the director to “consider the effect
of any such regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent
system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the
Office to timely complete proceedings instituted under this chapter”
when drafting regulations governing PTAB proceedings.154 With
respect to the first two considerations, the director could reasonably
find the effect of partial institution to be detrimental. It could hurt the
economy because it undercuts the cost savings promised by PTAB
proceedings, and it could hurt the integrity of the patent system
because it leads to duplicative processes with the district courts and
gaming of the system. Yet, these arguments are flimsy in comparison
to how directly the regulations meet the second two considerations
identified by Congress. Partial institution improves efficiency and
enables the PTAB to comply with its statutory deadline in the face of
voluminous challenges. Given how directly partial institution addresses
these considerations, and given that the statute itself does not specify
how to weigh each factor, the courts would likely defer to the PTO’s
balancing of the four considerations and corresponding determination
that partial institution satisfies the statute.
As a result, post-Cuozzo, the purposive argument against Chevron
deference is all but foreclosed. In Cuozzo, Cuozzo explicitly argued
that PTAB proceedings were designed to substitute for district court
litigation.155 The Court, however, rejected this notion in its Chevron
analysis despite clear indications in the America Invents Act and the
legislative history regarding this substitution purpose.156 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court gave short shrift to the argument that allowing
152. For more explanation on the purpose of PTAB proceedings, see supra Part I.A.
153. For more information regarding the argument that partial institution contravenes the
purpose of the America Invents Act, see supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
154. 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (emphasis added).
155. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016).
156. See id. (“The problem with Cuozzo’s argument, however, is that, in other significant
respects, inter partes review is less like a judicial proceeding and more like a specialized agency
proceeding.”).
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the PTAB to utilize a different standard than the district courts would
undermine the ability of the PTAB to replace district court litigation
on a subset of issues.157 Instead, the Supreme Court observed that the
purpose of IPRs is merely to “reexamine an earlier agency decision,”
not to substitute for district court litigation.158 Thus, challengers
opposing the application of Chevron deference by relying on the
purpose of PTAB proceedings are likely out of luck, given how directly
the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Cuozzo.159 Looking
beyond this one case, it also signals that challengers cannot rely on the
courts to uphold the careful system established by Congress. Because
the Supreme Court has spoken, Congress—and not the courts—must
be the actor to fix the system.
III. THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTION ON ESTOPPEL
Although the PTO likely had sufficient statutory authorization to
establish partial institution, partial institution nevertheless undermines
the estoppel system Congress created. Petitioners in an IPR cannot
later raise before a district court any ground they raised or reasonably
could have raised during the IPR.160 If the estoppel were interpreted as
broadly as the language of the statute suggests, petitioners could not
subsequently raise grounds on which the PTAB did not institute.161 In
other words, they could not later raise grounds that they never actually
had the opportunity to litigate before the PTAB.162 If, however, the
estoppel provision were interpreted in a more limited manner to apply
only to instituted grounds, the provision effectively becomes
meaningless. Nothing would prevent petitioners from subsequently
litigating noninstituted grounds, even if those noninstituted grounds

157. Id.
158. Id. at 2144 (“The name and accompanying procedures suggest that the proceeding offers
a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent. Although Congress changed . . .
‘reexamination’ to ‘review,’ nothing convinces us that, in doing so, Congress wanted to change its
basic purposes, namely, to reexamine an earlier agency decision.”).
159. See id. at 2142–43 (rejecting the argument that IPRs were intended to substitute for
district court litigation).
160. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2018).
161. See High, supra note 34, at 610 (“The likely result is that this provision estops the
petitioner from asserting grounds of unpatentability which neither the PTO nor a district court
has ever considered, leading to potentially unfair outcomes for the petitioner.”).
162. For an explanation of why petitioners reasonably would not have had the chance to
litigate their claims if the PTAB did not institute review on them, see infra Part III.A.
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are redundant with the instituted grounds.163 In this way, a limitedscope interpretation renders the “or reasonably could have been
raised” language a dead letter.164
As a result, the Federal Circuit faced an impossible situation when
it decided Shaw. It either had to sanction inequity by estopping
petitioners from raising grounds they never had a chance to litigate or
contravene the plain text of the statute, undermining the purposes for
which IPRs were created. The Federal Circuit opted for the latter
approach and applied a limited-scope interpretation to the estoppel
provision.165 In doing so, not only did the Federal Circuit contravene
the plain meaning of the America Invents Act, but it also chose an
interpretation that will create more trouble in the long term even if it
prevents inequity in the short term.
A. The Federal Circuit Incorrectly Interpreted the Estoppel Provision
Statutory interpretation begins with plain meaning.166 Plain
meaning is determined through “reference to the language itself, . . .
[and to] the specific context in which that language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole.”167 Here, the text, structure,
and purpose of the America Invents Act indicate that the estoppel
provision was intended to be interpreted broadly. Faced with a clear
interpretation, it is not the role of the courts to rewrite what Congress
has clearly prescribed.168 The Federal Circuit erred in its statutory
interpretation of the estoppel provision when it interpreted estoppel in
a more limited manner.
1. Text. The America Invents Act provides that petitioners who
bring an IPR before the PTAB cannot later raise “any ground that the
petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter
163. For an explanation of why this argument applies even to claims petitioners could have
raised in the petition but chose not to, see infra Part III.A.
164. See 157 CONG. REC. 2710 (2011) (“It also would include a strengthened estoppel
standard to prevent petitioners from raising in a subsequent challenge the same patent issues that
were raised or reasonably could have been raised in a prior challenge, [significantly reducing] the
ability to use post-grant procedures for abusive serial challenges to patents.”).
165. See Shaw Indus. Grp. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“The IPR does not begin until it is instituted. . . . Thus, Shaw did not raise—nor could it have
reasonably raised—the Payne-based ground during the IPR.”).
166. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081–82 (2015).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016) (“The
plain text of the [statute] begins and ends our analysis.”).
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partes review.”169 The Federal Circuit in Shaw focused on the “during”
language in the statute and held that a petitioner cannot later raise the
grounds on which the PTAB institutes because an IPR only begins with
institution.170 This interpretation, however, ignores the text proceeding
“during.” If a petitioner could not have raised redundant grounds
“during” an IPR because the PTAB did not institute upon those
grounds, a petitioner also could not have raised nonredundant but
unmeritorious grounds or grounds which were never included in the
petition at all “during” the IPR. After all, grounds raised but not
instituted due to redundancy are outside the scope of the estoppel
provision because those issues were not before the PTAB “during” the
IPR. By the same logic, nonredundant grounds or grounds excluded
from the petition should also be outside the scope of the estoppel
provision because those issues were also not before the PTAB
“during” the IPR. This outcome effectively renders the “or reasonably
could have raised” language meaningless.
2. Structure. The provisions of the America Invents Act do not
exist in a vacuum. Congress designed the various PTAB proceedings
to meet different needs within the patent system.171 The estoppel
provision attaching to IPRs must be analyzed in relation to the estoppel
provisions attaching to the other proceedings.172 In both IPRs and post
grant review proceedings, petitioners cannot subsequently raise “any
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised
during that . . . review.”173 In a covered business method review, on the
other hand, petitioners cannot subsequently raise “any ground that the
petitioner raised during that . . . proceeding.”174 The differing estoppel
parameters indicate that Congress knew how to apply a limited-scope
estoppel provision where it wished to have one. The fact that Congress
included the “or reasonably could have raised” language indicates that
it intended IPRs and post grant review proceedings to encompass a
wider range of challenges to the validity of a patent. The Federal
Circuit’s interpretation of the estoppel provision, which essentially

169. 35 U.S.C. §315(e) (2012).
170. See Shaw, 817 F.3d at 1300 (“The IPR does not begin until it is instituted. . . . Thus, Shaw
did not raise—nor could it have reasonably raised—the Payne-based ground during the IPR.”).
171. For an explanation of the purpose of PTAB proceedings, see supra Part I.A.
172. See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1081–82 (noting that statutory provisions must be analyzed with
reference to “the broader context of the statute as a whole”).
173. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e); id. § 325(e).
174. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(D), 35 U.S.C. § 321 note (2012).
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collapses the “raised or reasonably could have raised” into “raised,” is
at odds with the structure of various proceedings established by the
America Invents Act.
3. Purpose.
Although the Supreme Court has indicated
otherwise,175 legislative history indicates that Congress intended
proceedings before the PTAB to substitute for district court
litigation.176 The proceedings cannot serve as an effective alternative
without a strong estoppel provision to ensure that petitioners treat the
proceeding as their only forum to litigate novelty and nonobviousness
grounds.177 As matters stand now, petitioners can game the system and
use the proceedings before the PTAB as a free bite at the apple. They
can challenge the validity of a patent cheaply and quickly before the
PTAB and, if they lose, they preserve the nonobviousness and novelty
challenges that were not raised or instituted. This outcome clearly
stands at odds with the purpose for which Congress established IPRs,
and because the Supreme Court has indicated it will not fix the issues
inherent in the system,178 Congress must step in to protect the purpose
underlying IPRs.
Admittedly, IPRs can never fully substitute for district court
litigation because petitioners can only raise novelty and
nonobviousness grounds in such proceedings.179 One could reason that,
in the face of such a limitation, the purpose of IPRs cannot be to
completely replace district court litigation.180 This argument is

175. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (explaining that the
purpose of IPRs is to “reexamine an earlier agency decision”).
176. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. 3429 (2011) (“Ideally, extending could-have-raised estoppel to
privies will help ensure that if an inter partes review is instituted while litigation is pending, that
review will completely substitute for at least the patents-and-printed-publications portion of the
civil litigation.”). The Supreme Court’s decision to the contrary only further indicates that
Congress, and not the courts, must fix the inconsistencies in the statutory framework.
177. See 157 CONG. REC. 2710 (2011) (“It also would include a strengthened estoppel
standard [preventing] petitioners from raising in a subsequent challenge the same patent issues
that were raised or reasonably could have been raised in a prior challenge. The bill would
significantly reduce the ability to use post-grant procedures for abusive serial challenges to
patents.”).
178. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144 (noting that an IPR, instead of substituting for district
court litigation, merely “reexamine[s] an earlier agency decision”).
179. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
180. Petitioners could, for example, still challenge the validity of a patent on § 101 (patent
eligible subject matter and utility) or § 112 (written description, enablement, and definiteness)
grounds at the district court, IPR proceeding notwithstanding.
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bolstered by the fact that the Supreme Court in Cuozzo indicated that
IPRs exist merely to “reexamine an earlier agency decision.”181
But a deeper look at how IPRs function in relation to the other
proceedings and district court litigation reveals the flaw in this line of
reasoning. A patent, once issued, is presumed valid.182 A challenger
may, within the first nine months of a patent’s life,183 bring a post grant
review proceeding on any ground of invalidity.184 After nine
months185—unless the patent is a covered business method patent186—
a challenger may only bring an IPR on novelty and nonobviousness
grounds.187
The limited jurisdiction within IPRs gives due effect to the
presumption of validity. Novelty and nonobviousness grounds focus on
the relationship between the patent at issue and other patents and
publications known to the inventor at the time of invention.188
Essentially, these challenges deal with the information available to the
inventor at the time of invention. In contrast, a patent-eligible subject
matter challenge, for example, focuses on the content of the patent
itself and whether the invention claimed is eligible for claiming at all.
It does not undermine the presumption of validity to review novelty
and nonobviousness challenges, which relate to the information before
an inventor at the time of invention. These grounds do not argue that
something inherently wrong with the content of the patent itself makes
the patent invalid. Instead, they argue that outside material renders the
patent invalid because the patent claims either are obvious or not novel
in light of other information. The limitation on which challenges one
can raise during an IPR does not undermine the purpose of providing
an alternative to district courts, but rather it effectuates the
presumption of validity of issued patents.
Furthermore, the fact that the challenges are limited does not
mean that Congress did not intend for the proceedings to provide a

181. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143. For more information on the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the purpose of IPRs, see supra Part II.C.
182. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a).
183. Id. § 321(c).
184. Id. § 321(b).
185. Id. § 311(c).
186. For more information on covered business method review, see supra Part I.B.2.
187. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
188. In patent law, other patents and publications would be included in the category of “prior
art.” Prior art is any information that a person having ordinary skill in the art—in other words, an
expert in the field—would have known at the time of the invention.
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complete substitute for district court litigation on those specific
grounds. Even if an IPR cannot fully replace district court litigation on
all grounds relating to the validity of a patent, it can nevertheless
significantly reduce the number of issues that can be raised in district
court litigation.
B. A Limited-Scope Estoppel is a Poor Solution in the Long Term
The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of estoppel poses many
dangers to the system created by Congress in the long term. There is
no real way to cabin the Federal Circuit’s line of reasoning in Shaw.
The Federal Circuit’s focus on the “during” language within the
estoppel provision succeeds in preventing inequity in the short term,189
but it logically extends to cover grounds not instituted upon for reasons
relating to the merits rather than redundancy. It can further be
extended to cover even grounds that were not included in the petition
at all, negating the “or reasonably could have raised” language in the
statute.190 In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corporation,191 for
example, the District of Delaware noted that it had no choice but to
allow the litigant to raise grounds not included in its IPR petition.192
The court reasoned that, because those grounds were not raised
“during” the IPR, its decision was controlled by the holding of Shaw.193
It reached this conclusion despite recognizing that this outcome
contravenes the purpose of the America Invents Act.194 In
subsequently reviewing a request for reconsideration, the court

189. Inequity arises here when petitioners cannot later raise grounds which they never had a
chance to fully litigate before the PTAB.
190. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 (D. Del.
2016) (“Although extending the [Shaw] logic to prior art references that were never presented to
the PTAB at all (despite their public nature) confounds the very purpose of this parallel
administrative proceeding, the court cannot divine a reasoned way around the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation in Shaw.”), recons. denied, Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., Civ. No.
13-453-SLR, 2017 WL 107980 (D. Del. Jan. 11, 2017).
191. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 (D. Del. 2016).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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allowed for more shades of nuance on the issue195 but ultimately
declined to reconsider its prior decision.196
Restricting the estoppel exception to cover only grounds raised
but not instituted can only be achieved by a feat of interpretive
gymnastics not authorized by the text of the America Invents Act. It
makes the PTAB the “invalidity arbiter of first resort”197 rather than
the sole arbiter. Not only would this outcome “be inconsistent with all
of the limitations imposed by the PTAB on IPR proceedings,”198 but it
would result in gamesmanship and circumvent the purpose of the
statute. Petitioners would be incentivized to include as many grounds
as possible with minimum detail, despite PTAB guidance
recommending including fewer and more detailed grounds.199 In this
way, a petitioner’s goal would expressly be to have the PTAB institute
on only some of the grounds, leaving the others available for later
litigation in the event the petitioner lost before the PTAB. This result
would directly undermine the purpose for which IPRs were created.
IV. SOLUTION
Congress needs to step in to fix the issues within the America
Invents Act. Although it likely could not have anticipated the way in
which the PTAB and the courts have developed IPRs, flawed drafting
within the America Invents Act made this outcome possible. Given the
broad grant of rulemaking power within the America Invents Act, the
PTO did not act outside the bounds of its authority in drafting a
regulation enabling partial institution.200 Yet, the combination of
195. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 2017 WL 107980, at *1 (recognizing that the Federal Circuit
had not ruled on this fact pattern and that policy arguments existed to support extending the
estoppel to grounds not raised or cabining it only to grounds raised but not instituted).
196. Id. at *2 (“On the whole, since it is not my place to make policy decisions, I am not
inclined to change my original decision, with the hopes that an appeal may clarify the issue for
future judges in future cases.”).
197. Id. at *1.
198. Id.
199. See Katie J.L. Scott, Federal Circuit Adopts a Redundancy Exception to Estoppel
Following Inter Partes Review, 28 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13, 14 (2016) (“Notably, the
unintended consequence of the PTO’s position and Shaw’s endorsement of that position is that
petitioners will be incentivized to include as many grounds as will fit within the space constraints
of a petition, contrary to the PTAB’s oft-provided guidance to include fewer, more detailed
arguments . . . .”).
200. This is covered in more depth at supra Part II.C. Although the PTO could arguably
update its regulations regarding partial institution to eliminate some of the issues highlighted in
this Note, in light of the strict deadline the PTAB must comply with and limited resources to hire
more personnel, the PTO is unlikely to take this step in the future. This solution also would not
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partial institution without a corresponding way for the courts to review
the decision to institute absent “shenanigans”201 creates a situation in
which a properly applied estoppel provision leads to inequity. To
interpret that estoppel provision in a more limited manner than
intended, however, undermines the entire purpose for which IPRs
were established because estoppel is the glue that holds the system
together.202 IPRs cannot substitute for district court litigation unless
they are the sole forum in which given challenges can be raised and
litigated. The solution to the drafting flaws in the America Invents Act
thus cannot be to limit the reach of the estoppel provision.
A. The Federal Circuit Should Reconsider its Interpretation in Shaw
In order to fix the system, the Federal Circuit should reconsider
its interpretation on estoppel. Congress intended for the estoppel
provision to broadly cover all grounds which were raised or which
could have been raised in a petition for an IPR.203 In other words, if
petitioners decide to avail themselves of the benefits of an IPR
(winning and saving resources that might otherwise have been spent
litigating before the district court), petitioners must also consign
themselves to the risks an IPR entails (losing and being estopped from
subsequently raising additional challenges on novelty or
nonobviousness grounds). By ignoring the mandates of the America
Invents Act, the Federal Circuit has essentially eliminated any risk
petitioners face in bringing an IPR. Petitioners may now game the
system and give themselves a quick, cheap chance to invalidate a patent
at little to no personal cost. The only way to fix this outcome is to apply
the estoppel provision as broadly as the text, structure, and purpose of
the statute indicate.204
Reinterpreting the estoppel provision may lead to inequity in the
short term by estopping petitioners from raising claims which they

fix the flaws in the statutory drafting enabling this outcome, so there would always be the threat
that this issue would arise again in the future. In light of these obstacles, this Note will not address
this solution in depth.
201. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141–42 (2016).
202. See 157 CONG. REC. 2710 (2011) (“It also would include a strengthened estoppel
standard to prevent petitioners from raising in a subsequent challenge the same patent issues that
were raised or reasonably could have been raised in a prior challenge. The bill would significantly
reduce the ability to use post-grant procedures for abusive serial challenges to patents.”).
203. For an explanation of the purpose of the estoppel provision, see supra Part III.
204. For an explanation of why the estoppel provision should be interpreted broadly, see
supra Part III.A.
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never had a chance to litigate before the PTAB.205 Yet, courts should
not contravene the plain meaning of the statute. The legislature, and
not the courts, must fix the inequity within the statute. The inequity,
moreover, may add extra heft to the calls for legislative reform. If
petitioners lose the ability to later raise grounds which they never had
the chance to litigate before the PTAB, and this is broadly perceived
as an injustice, then Congress may have additional incentive to correct
the system. This is especially possible given the power and influence of
the technology sector, which boasts many repeat players in the patent
system and stands to gain if the system improves. Congress ultimately
will need to step in to correct the drafting of the America Invents Act,
so any additional impetus to spur the legislature into action can only
serve to benefit patent holders and challengers in the long term.
B. Congress Should Intervene to Correct the System
There are a number of actions Congress could take to ameliorate
the effects of the combination of a broad grant of rulemaking authority,
a lack of review on the decision to institute, and an estoppel provision
that holds the whole system together. First, Congress could amend the
text regarding institution to clearly prohibit partial institution. Second,
Congress could require that in final decisions the PTAB must address
all grounds raised in the petition, even those not instituted upon,
allowing petitioners to preserve the right to appeal. Lastly, Congress
could alter the substantive grant of powers to the PTO in the America
Invents Act and either remove the PTO’s ability to issue rules or the
unreviewability of the PTAB’s initial decision to institute.
First, Congress could explicitly require all-or-none institution in
the statutory provisions regarding IPRs. One of the main issues with
the system as currently structured is that Congress has not clearly
allowed or prohibited partial institution. If there is ambiguity in the
text, the courts will defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is
reasonable,206 and it is hard to argue that the PTO’s interpretation of
the statute is not reasonable. The America Invents Act enables the
PTO to consider concerns about efficiency and its ability to meet the
statutory deadline in drafting its regulations.207 If Congress were to
explicitly require all-or-none institution, however, a regulation
205. For an acknowledgement of the inequity of a petitioner losing the chance to litigate
noninstituted grounds, see supra Part III.
206. For more information on agency deference, see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
207. 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (2012).
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allowing for partial institution would clearly violate the text of the
statute, thereby allowing courts to enforce all-or-none institution.
Yet, all-or-none institution may not be the perfect solution. The
PTO had valid concerns regarding the ability of the PTAB to review
every ground raised by the petitioners in a petition and still meet its
deadline. It would be unrealistic, for instance, to expect the PTAB to
reach a decision on over four hundred grounds of invalidity against a
set of patent claims within a year, especially given the volume of
petitions it receives each year.208 Even with a good-cause extension of
six months,209 the deadline would be nearly impossible to meet. One
way to resolve this dilemma would be to make the PTAB distinguish
redundant grounds210 from nonmeritorious grounds that fail to meet
the evidentiary standard for invalidity.211
Second, instead of requiring all-or-none institution, Congress
could update the requirements of a final written decision. It could
require the PTAB to address noninstituted grounds in the final written
decision, thereby allowing petitioners to preserve the right to appeal.
As the provision currently reads, the PTAB is required to “issue a final
written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim
challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added under section
316(d).”212 Some parties have argued that this provision even now
requires the PTAB to address every ground raised in the petition in
this decision.213 The Federal Circuit, however, rejected this argument

208. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00003, 2012 WL
9494791, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012) (highlighting that the petitioner in a covered business
method review proceeding raised 422 grounds challenging twenty patent claims); 2016 PTAB
Statistics, supra note 14 (listing the number of petitions filed before the PTAB).
209. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).
210. See High, supra note 34, at 612 (“To avoid the loss of a petitioner’s right to appeal on a
redundant ground, the PTAB could institute an IPR based on all grounds that show a reasonable
likelihood of unpatentability and then declare some of the grounds cumulative in a subsequent
order.”).
211. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1 (2017) (“The default evidentiary standard is a preponderance of the
evidence.”).
212. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
213. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The
petitioner argued, as does SAS, that the text of the final written decision statutory subsection, 35
U.S.C. § 318(a), compels the Board to address every petition challenged claim.”), cert. granted,
137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017); Wilson & Sieman, supra note 121 (“The set of ‘claim[s] challenged by the
petitioner’ depends on which claims the petitioner includes in the petition, not on a later decision
by the PTAB. The statutory language leaves little doubt the final written decision—the
appealable one—must address the patentability of every claim challenged in the petition.”).
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in SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC.214 The court “found it
significant that § 318(a) describes ‘claims challenged by the petitioner,’
whereas the institution decision statutory subsection, 35 U.S.C. § 314,
describes ‘claims challenged in the petition.’”215 Because the variation
in language between these two sections provided a basis for
interpreting them differently,216 updating the language of § 318(a) to
mirror the language of § 314 would remove the basis of treating the
sections differently. This means the PTAB would have to address every
ground raised in the petition in its decision.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in the Federal
Circuit’s decision in SAS Institute.217 It may soon require the PTAB to
address every ground raised in the petition in its written decision, even
the noninstituted ones. If the Supreme Court were to reverse the
Federal Circuit’s decision, depending on what—if anything—the
Supreme Court requires the PTAB to include in the written decision,
the decision could further sow chaos into the statutory framework. A
decision to require the PTAB to address every ground raised in the
petition, even noninstituted grounds, could pose due process issues.218
It would set the PTAB up to decide an issue which the parties never
got a chance to litigate, thereby violating “the fundamental
requirement of due process,” namely “the opportunity to be heard ‘at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”219 In order to avoid
this potential due process issue, the written decision could explain the
fact that the PTAB chose not to institute review because the ground
did not meet the statutory requirements for institution. This
explanation, however, would conflict with the unreviewability of the

214. See SAS Inst., Inc., 825 F.3d at 1352 (“We found, however, no statutory requirement that
the Board’s final decision address every claim raised in a petition for inter partes review.”). The
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on this decision. SAS Inst., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2160.
215. SAS Inst., Inc., 825 F.3d at 1352.
216. Id.
217. SAS Inst., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2160.
218. The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether IPRs are formal or informal adjudications.
The Court’s decision in Cuozzo, because it applies Chevron deference, indicates the proceeding
might be formal adjudication and thus subject to more stringent due process requirements. See
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001) (denying Chevron deference for
informal adjudication); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such
as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals,
and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style
deference.”).
219. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
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decision not to institute an IPR.220 The appellate court reviewing the
decision not to institute would need the authority to address the merits
of the ground raised below rather than merely the authority to review
the PTAB’s decision not to institute an IPR on that ground.221 This
outcome would preserve the unreviewability of the initial decision to
institute while still avoiding the inequity associated with a lack of any
judicial review.
Third, Congress could also target the substantive powers at play
in undermining the system, namely its grant of broad rulemaking
authority to the PTO or the unreviewability of the decision to institute.
These powers, however, were given for a reason and to remove them
would pose a new set of dangers for the system. Without rulemaking
authority, for example, it would be difficult for the PTO to regulate the
proceedings before the PTAB. Congress would need to provide more
guidance on the standards of review and conduct of the proceedings,
which would require more time and waste more resources. The system
can run much more efficiently with most of the regulation coming from
a single agency. The fact that the powers could be used to the detriment
of the system in one way does not mean that the powers should not
exist at all. In a similar vein, allowing the courts to review every
decision to institute or not institute an IPR would create vast
inefficiency within the system. The proceedings are designed to be
completed within a year.222 This deadline would be impossible to meet
if petitioners were able to litigate the decision to institute before the
courts. The main benefits of PTAB proceedings—the savings in time
and resources—would be immediately lost.
It is worth highlighting that if the Federal Circuit were to
reconsider its estoppel interpretation such that it conforms to the
statute but works harsher results, petitioners might be reluctant to
bring IPR procedures until Congress is able to update the statute. Yet,
petitioners had no way to know how broad estoppel was for IPRs until
the Federal Circuit ruled in Shaw, and nonetheless brought many IPRs
before the Shaw decision.223 Given the history of IPR use before Shaw,
220. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012) (making the decision to institute or not institute an IPR
unreviewable).
221. This solution may pose the additional issue of whether to allow for supplementation of
the record on review for challenges to the decision not to institute review.
222. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).
223. Shaw was decided on March 23, 2016. Shaw Indus. Grp. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc.,
817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Between September 16, 2012 and March 31, 2016, petitioners made
a total of 4743 petitions to the PTAB. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND

GENTILLI IN FC (CLEAN) (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

4/11/2018 11:39 PM

A FREE BITE AT THE APPLE

1613

it seems unlikely that a reconsideration of the estoppel provision would
significantly deter petitioners from seeking out IPRs.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit in Shaw significantly undermined the ability
of PTAB proceedings to substitute for district court litigation on
novelty and nonobviousness grounds. Instead of ensuring that
petitioners are held to the decisions of a single forum with respect to
any grounds which the petitioners raised or could have raised during
an IPR, the Federal Circuit opened the door for gamesmanship and
abuse of the system. Petitioners may now use IPRs as a free chance to
invalidate a patent while preserving redundant grounds that effectively
argue the same point for subsequent district court litigation.
While it would be easy to place all of the blame on the Federal
Circuit for this turn of events, Shaw itself does not shoulder all of the
responsibility. Shaw merely highlights a larger underlying problem
within the drafting of the America Invents Act itself. Congress created
a perfect storm with the broad grant of rulemaking power to the PTO,
unreviewable PTAB decisions to institute, and the estoppel provision.
This combination led to a scenario in which the correct interpretation
of the estoppel provision would inevitably lead to inequity. It is not,
however, the role of the Federal Circuit to correct mistakes in a
statutory scheme devised by Congress. A limited-scope interpretation
of estoppel only further sows chaos and disorder within the system.
Congress must step in to correct the inadequacies. It should require
either that the PTAB institute on all or none of the grounds raised in a
petition or that the final written decision address every ground raised
by the petitioner and provide for appellate review on the merits of each
ground.
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31,
2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-3-31%20PTAB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ELM6-WFR8]. Of those 4743 petitions, 4288 were petitions for an IPR. Id. As
of December 31, 2016, petitioners made a cumulative total of 6143 petitions to the PTAB, 5591
of which were for an IPR. 2016 PTAB Statistics, supra note 14.

